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285 
REGAINING TRUST IN NONPROFIT CHARTER 
SCHOOLS: TOWARD BENEFIT CORPORATION 
BRANDING FOR FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION 
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a 
better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed 
clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the 
evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms—greed for life, 
for money, for love, knowledge—has marked the upward 
surge of mankind. And greed, you mark my words, will not 
only save Teldar Paper, but that other malfunctioning 
corporation called the USA. Thank you very much.1  
– The infamous stock-trading mogul, Gordon Gekko, in the 
movie Wall Street. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT AMERICAN 
NONPROFIT CHARTER SCHOOL LANDSCAPE 
Since the first charter school opened in Minnesota in 1991, 
the political and educational spheres have enshrined charter 
schools in positive rhetoric, hailing them as “laboratories of 
innovation.”2 Encouraging charter school creation is one of the 
cornerstones of the Obama Administration’s “Race to the Top” 
program, and this support is similarly reflected in federal and 
state legislatures.3 Notwithstanding conflicting studies 
assessing charter school effectiveness as compared to 
traditional public schools, it is clear from the annually 
 
 1 WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 2 Susan L. DeJarnatt, Follow the Money: Charter Schools and Financial 
Accountability, 44 URB. LAW. 37, 38 (2012). 
 3 See Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Educational 
Federalism: President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 522, 527 (2011) (Under Obama’s “Race to the Top” program, 
“one specific criterion awarded up to forty points for states that had created conditions 
to promote the development of high-performing public charter schools and other 
innovative schools. The weighting clearly favored charter schools, though, because if a 
state had many policies to promote different alternatives except charter schools then 
the most it could earn on this criterion was eight points.”). See also DeJarnatt, supra 
note 2, at 38. 
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increasing number of charter schools coupled with federal and 
state backing that charter schools are here to stay.4  
Despite the optimistic affirmation that charter schools 
receive, the nonprofit charter school movement has recently 
come under intense government and media scrutiny.5 This has 
been spurred by scandals involving education management 
organizations (“EMOs”), which some nonprofit charter schools 
hire to operate their charter schools wholly or in part.6  
The scrutiny began when the growing number of nonprofit 
charter schools caught the private sector’s attention several 
years ago. Venture capital firms and hedge fund managers 
began to view nonprofit charter schools as a “largely untapped 
and potentially lucrative market.”7 This raised an interesting 
question: why did venture capital firms and hedge fund 
managers find nonprofit charter schools so attractive as a 
 
 4 See Elaine Liu, Solving the Puzzle of Charter Schools: A New Framework for 
Understanding and Improving Charter School Legislation and Performance, 2015 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 273, 285–89 (2015). While it is not this Note’s purpose to evaluate 
whether charter schools deliver superior education to public schools, it is worth noting 
that there are many conflicting studies assessing charter school effectiveness. Several 
studies have seriously questioned the premise that charter schools employ innovative 
teaching methods both more effectively and more often than public schools. What is 
certain though, is that much like in public schools, student performance varies 
significantly between charter schools in the same states and across different states. 
 5 John Morley, For-Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An Agency Costs 
Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 1795 (2006). Scholars and the public sometimes conflate 
a charter school’s entity choice, such as being a nonprofit versus for-profit entity, with 
a third-party contractor’s form, and then refer to the charter school as a nonprofit or 
for-profit based on the contractor’s form. This is incorrect because sometimes the 
charter school is a nonprofit that holds the school’s charter and manages its own 
running. But sometimes nonprofit charter schools hold the charter, but then contract 
with an external contractor or business to run a substantial part of the school. In the 
United States, charter schools, also known as charter holders, can be nonprofit or for-
profit institutions. However, a majority of charter schools are nonprofits because many 
states’ laws dictate whether a charter school must be a nonprofit. Then, if a charter 
school contracts with a vendor or business, that business can be a for-profit or 
nonprofit organization itself. And again, there are sometimes state laws regulating 
whom a charter school can contract with. This Note will focus on nonprofit charter 
schools because the issues addressed solely affect nonprofit charter schools. 
 6 See Kathleen McGrory, South Miami-Based Charter School Management 
Company Under Federal Scrutiny, MIAMI HERALD (April 20, 2014, 9:51 AM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1963142.html 
Florida’s largest charter school management company came under federal scrutiny 
after an audit report identified “potential conflicts of interest between the for-profit 
company Academica and the Mater Academy charter schools it manages. One example 
the auditors cited was the transfer of money from Mater Academy to its private 
support organization, which shares the same board of directors.” Id. 
 7 F. Howard Nelson, What Does Private Management Offer Public Education?, 
11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 272 (2000). 
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means of raising capital when, in return for favorable tax 
treatment, nonprofit charter schools are prohibited from 
having shareholders or distributing profits?8 The answer came 
when the private sector started funding for-profit EMOs to 
contract with and operate nonprofit charter schools.9 Funding 
EMOs to contract with charter schools had the effect of 
diverting the state and federal government funding nonprofit 
charter schools received into EMO coffers, which then ended up 
in the private sector’s pockets.10 The private sector can access 
state funding reserved for public education raised through 
taxes because although many states mandate that charter 
schools must be nonprofits, there is often no legislation 
precluding nonprofit charter schools from contracting with and 
paying for-profit organizations for educational services with 
their public funding.11 Investing in EMOs became such a 
profitable business that firms began providing courses in how 
to best privatize charter school education, such as a master 
class taught by Capital Roundtables called “Private Equity 
Investing in For-Profit Education Companies.”12 Further, the 
federal “New Markets Tax Credit” program under the Clinton 
administration gave businesses that invest in charter schools 
in “underserved” areas a 39% tax credit to offset costs, 
incentivizing investing in charter schools and EMOs.13  
Some EMOs have since taken a page out of Gordon Gekko’s 
book of greed and have been accused of engaging in fraudulent 
activities; nonprofit charter school operators have set up for-
 
 8 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 
(1980). 
 9 Kathleen Conn, When School Management Companies Fail: Righting 
Educational Wrongs, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 245, 253 (2002). 
 10 Id. (“[W]hen state charter school laws allow large for-profit corporations to 
manage schools, or when nonprofit managers contract with for-profit companies to 
provide educational services, the specter of for-profit companies misappropriating tax 
dollars is especially frightening.”). 
 11 See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1002.33 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2065(b)(1) (States 
such as Florida and Georgia are either completely silent on whether charter schools 
may contract with EMOs, or explicitly allow for them to do so). 
 12 Kristin Rawls, Who is Profiting From Charters? The Big Bucks Behind 
Charter School Secrecy, Financial Scandal and Corruption, ALTERNET (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.alternet.org/education/who-profiting-charters-big-bucks-behind-charter-
school-secrecy-financial-scandal-and. 
 13 Addison Wiggin, Charter School Gravy Train Runs Express to Fat City, 
FORBES (Sep. 10, 2013, 5:31 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/09/10/charter-school-gravy-train-
runs-express-to-fat-city/#3e9312b270e5. 
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profit EMOs to extract and distribute their charter school’s 
operating profits.14 Another instance of EMOs abusing charter 
school funding occurred when EMOs began redirecting funds 
allocated to teacher salaries and resource development to 
charge charter schools inflated rent for their facilities.15 While 
EMOs manage only approximately 15% of all American 
nonprofit charter schools, the negative effects that a few EMOs 
have had on the charter schools they manage have cast a 
shadow over the charter school movement and other for-profit 
EMOs that help charter schools without harming them.16 The 
actions of the EMOs involved in scandals are at great odds with 
their professed goal of “shap[ing] a world in which every 
student, regardless of socioeconomic circumstance, has access 
to an excellent education.”17  
Charter school exploitation has become such a problem that 
the New York State Legislature revised the state’s Charter 
Schools Act in May 2010 to prohibit EMOs from contracting 
with charter schools.18 Charter schools that contracted with 
EMOs prior to the change were allowed to continue their 
association.19 New York revised its charter school statute 
because although only a small portion of the state’s charter 
schools had partnered with EMOs, the bad press that a few 
EMO-charter school affiliations created detracted from much of 
the positive work that many EMO- and non-EMO-managed 
 
 14 Emma Brown, D.C. Officials Seek Stronger Oversight of Charter Schools After 
Recent Fraud Allegations, WASH. POST (June 15, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/dc-officials-seek-stronger-oversight-of-
charter-schools-after-recent-fraud-allegations/2014/06/15/fb5e1042-f0b4-11e3-bf76-
447a5df6411f_story.html; Morley, supra note 5, at 1789 (Charter school operators are 
those who apply to the relevant state agency for a charter, and once approved, hold the 
charter). 
 15 Catherine Candisky, Charter School’s Lease Deals Scrutinized, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Oct. 12, 2014, 10:10 AM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/10/12/charters-lease-deals-
scrutinized.html. 
 16 NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS, A CLOSER LOOK AT THE 
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 8 (2016) http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/New-Closed-2016.pdf (hereinafter “NATIONAL ALLIANCE”). 
 17 Mission, EDISON LEARNING, http://edisonlearning.com/mission.php (last 
visited June 8, 2016). 
 18 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2851(1). 
 19 NEW YORK CITY CHARTER SCHOOL CENTER, THE PROFIT MYTH: 
UNDERSTANDING THE STRUCTURE OF NEW YORK CHARTER SCHOOLS 6 (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.nyccharterschools.org/sites/default/files/resources/charter_school_profit_my
th.pdf. 
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charter schools had accomplished.20 In order to make sure that 
state education funding went to improving student education 
instead of for-profit EMO operators, other states have also 
banned charter schools from partnering with EMOs, including 
New Mexico, Washington, Connecticut, and Mississippi.21 
Further, some charter schools have had to shut down because 
of EMO mismanagement, and these closures severely disrupted 
the education process for students.22 Parents then often 
enrolled their children in traditional public schools, causing an 
overcrowding problem that the now shuttered charter schools 
were meant to alleviate in the first place.23 
While there is support for states forbidding charter schools 
from contracting with EMOs, there are arguments in favor of 
allowing them to continue contracting with EMOs.24 For 
example, EMOs often have greater managerial control over a 
charter school’s internal operations, and EMOs have the 
capital required to invest in research and develop innovative 
teaching methods that their traditional public school 
counterparts often lack.25 However, the foremost reason that a 
party operating a new charter school hires an EMO is that the 
party often lacks sufficient experience in school management.26 
Thus EMOs may remain an important component of the 
charter school movement as they offer new charter school 
operators the expertise and resources required to get a charter 
school off the ground.27  
There is tension between states allowing EMOs to continue 
providing charter schools with beneficial expertise and the 
need to prevent the damage that some EMOs have caused by 
 
 20 Id. at 5 (By 2011, 9% of the 185 charter schools in New York state had 
contracted with EMOs.). 
 21 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66aa (West 2016); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 37-28-
39 (West 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-4 (West 2017); 2016 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 
241 (E.S.S.S.B. 6194) (West). 
 22 See Conn, supra note 9, at 249. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 GUILBERT C. HENTSCHKE ET AL., TRENDS & BEST PRACTICES FOR EDUCATION 
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 5–6 (2003) https://www.wested.org/online_pubs/PP-03-
02.pdf. 
 26 Julia Davis, Contracts, Control and Charter Schools: The Success of Charter 
Schools Depends on Stronger Nonprofit Board Oversight to Preserve Independence and 
Prevent Domination by For-Profit Management Companies, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 8 
(2011). 
 27 Id. (For example, EMOs are better able to negotiate discounted prices for 
school supplies). 
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exploiting charter schools. The approach some states have 
taken is to bar EMOs completely from contracting with charter 
schools, and this tactic threatens EMOs’ continuing existence.28 
Other states have walked a middle ground by appointing 
independent charter school review boards to oversee charter 
schools.29 But some argue that adding additional levels of 
bureaucracy in the chartering process may interfere with the 
original intent behind charter school proliferation—namely, 
charter school autonomy and innovation.30 Increasing 
legislative hostility toward EMOs means that if offending 
EMOs do not change their ways, the focus of the EMO business 
model will change. EMOs will no longer be able to focus on 
developing innovative teaching methods that will improve 
student performance and lead to contract renewal.31 Instead, 
their chief concern will be stopping state legislatures from 
preventing contracts with charter schools altogether because a 
few EMOs have engaged in questionable business practices.  
Poor student performance in EMO operated charter schools 
has resulted in charter school closures. However, failure to 
improve charter school education is not the main reason why 
states are reconsidering EMO-charter school affiliations. Gross 
financial mismanagement, difficulty tracking how taxpayer 
money is spent once it moves from the charter schools into 
EMOs, and fraudulent activities are fueling the legislative 
backlash against EMOs in states like New York.32 This Note 
 
 28 See Kathleen Conn, For-Profit School Management Corporations: Serving the 
Wrong Master, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 129, 147 (2002) (“The surest way to abolish the conflict 
inherent in the corporate paradigm of shareholder wealth maximization and using 
corporate funds to provide the best possible education for students is to prohibit for-
profit corporations from managing schools.”). 
 29 Arianna Prothero, More States Create Independent Charter Approval Boards, 
EDUCATION WEEK (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/01authorizers.h34.html. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Conn, supra note 28, at 146 (“In most school privatization contracts, the 
school district engages the management corporation, turns over the reins of the school 
system, and expects improvement in school district finances and in students’ 
educational performance. If the expected results do not materialize, the school district 
can ‘fire’ the managers and resume control.”). 
 32 See Conn, supra note 9, at 249 (“However, mismanagement, loss of building 
leases, and failure to provide promised educational programs also caused closures.”); 
Marian Wang, When Charter Schools are Nonprofit in Name Only, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 
9, 2014, 11:49 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/when-charter-schools-are-
nonprofit-in-name-only (“Regulators in the District of Columbia are seeking more legal 
authority over management firms after two recent scandals. The DC Public Charter 
School Board has asked the city council to pass legislation that would allow access to 
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does not seek to evaluate how successful for-profit EMOs are at 
improving the charter schools they work with, because “no 
state has analyzed student achievement in charter schools 
managed by private managers separately from other charter 
schools.”33 Given current projections concerning the prominence 
of EMO and charter school partnerships, nonprofit charter 
schools will continue contracting with for-profit EMOs, 
regardless of performance results, as long as the individual 
states allow these relationships.34 As such, this Note will argue 
that EMOs are potentially valuable to the nonprofit charter 
school movement. EMOs that provide these benefits need to 
operate in a way that generates profit while avoiding scandal, 
which harms their public perception, because both have a great 
deal to offer in terms of bringing education to at-risk children.35 
This Note will concentrate on what EMOs can do to regain the 
trust of state legislatures so that they are not banned from 
contracting with charter schools.  
This Note suggests that moving forward, EMOs should 
choose to be “benefit corporations” as opposed to traditional C-
Corps, and to re-brand themselves as such. The benefit 
corporation is a new hybrid entity that allows a corporation to 
balance the traditional shareholder wealth maximization norm 
that corporations generally follow with making decisions that 
advance a general public benefit.36 In the case of EMOs, their 
general public benefit would be providing nonprofit charter 
schools with resources and expertise in exchange for fees. By 
adopting the benefit corporation brand, EMOs can show state 
legislatures that they are capable of balancing profit-making 
prerogatives while benefiting nonprofit charter schools that 
hire them. Benefit corporation statutes hold benefit 
corporations accountable via two devices: independent third-
party evaluators and internal enforcement proceedings.37 
Implementing these measures would allow states to avoid 
 
the books of management companies under certain conditions. So far, the effort has 
gone nowhere.”). 
 33 Nelson, supra note 7, at 281. 
 34 Gary Miron, Profiles of For-Profit and Nonprofit Education Management 
Organization, NATIONAL EDUCATION POLICY CENTER 5 (2013), 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/emo-profiles-11-12.pdf. 
 35 Liu, supra note 4, at 294. 
 36 Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 106–07 
(2012). 
 37 Id. at 106–09. 
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adding new bureaucratic layers of charter school oversight, 
thus saving state resources and allowing charter schools to 
maintain their original autonomy.38  
While the potential for a decrease in both profits and new 
potential investors may make some EMOs hesitant to become 
benefit corporations, there is evidence that acting in a socially 
responsible way may actually increase a business’s profits and 
attract investors who want to make a profit but also want their 
money used in conscientious ways.39 Further, it may be more 
advantageous for EMOs to be socially responsible than to risk 
states following in New York’s footsteps and banning them 
entirely, which would have a greater negative affect on an 
EMO’s profits.40  
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II lays out the 
background necessary for understanding why charter schools 
exist and their importance in improving American public 
education. This Part will provide an overview of the nonprofit 
charter school system, including the historical backdrop 
against which states passed charter school legislation, how 
charter schools operate, and the benefits that charter schools 
provide.  
Part III explains EMOs, including their function, their 
association with the charter school movement, and the benefits 
and drawbacks of EMOs contracting with charter schools. This 
Part then explores in detail why EMOs are the center of many 
nonprofit charter school scandals and how these scandals have 
resulted in some states banning EMOs from contracting with 
charter schools. The Part will examine several instances where 
charter schools and EMOs have been investigated for a lack of 
transparency as to how EMOs spend public funding and for 
charging charter schools inflated rent. 
Part IV introduces the benefit corporation. This Part will 
argue that by rebranding themselves as benefit corporations, 
EMOs can continue to profit from the public education sector 
while not making choices that mismanage charter school 
funding. First, this Part will explain the key characteristics of 
the benefit corporation entity by comparing the model approach 
to benefit corporations against the Delaware approach. Next, 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 110. 
 40 Wang, supra note 32. 
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this Part will explore how becoming a benefit corporation will 
advance EMOs both by preventing states from banning them 
from contracting with charter schools, and by helping them 
attract investors and potential shareholders. 
Part V will conclude the Note, arguing that EMOs should 
not follow the path of Gordon Gekko’s greed speech, and should 
instead embrace the benefit corporation and regain the trust of 
the states, remain open, and help charter schools. 
II. BACKGROUND: AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 
CHARTER SCHOOL SYSTEM 
A. The Historical Underpinnings that Lead to Individual 
States Passing Charter School Legislation 
While the Supreme Court does not recognize education as a 
fundamental right, the Supreme Court agreed that education 
was nonetheless of “undisputed importance.”41 Since Brown v. 
Board of Education, the Supreme Court charged state and local 
governments with the important task of monitoring and 
advancing education.42 With the Supreme Court placing this 
responsibility on the individual states, state governments 
scrambled to improve their education systems.43 However, as of 
August 2015, 92% of Americans reported being less than totally 
satisfied with the education that students receive in 
kindergarten through grade twelve (“K–12”), and by extension, 
less than satisfied with the efforts of their respective states in 
the education arena.44 This admittedly high statistic is not a 
recent trend.45 In fact, America’s lack of total satisfaction with 
K–12 education has lingered between 90 and 93% since August 
1999, and this trend likely extends back many years.46 In 
response to dissatisfaction among parents over the lack of 
education options, quality, and diversity in K–12 education, 
states began passing legislation granting “independent school 
operator[s]” the ability to create charter schools while placing 
 
 41 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
 42 Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is 
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.”). 
 43 Education Poll, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1612/Education.aspx 
(last visited June 2, 2016). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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few restrictions on who could start one.47  
The charter school concept is based on Milton Friedman’s 
free market theories, which posit that allowing parents their 
choice of schools would promote competition between charter 
school operators and traditional public school operators.48 A 
more competitive education market would theoretically be 
“more innovative, responsive, and efficient than government-
run education ‘monopolies.’”49 This is as opposed to the then-
dominant Keynesian economic model, which stressed that the 
government, and not the free market, should guide the 
allocation of capital and resources in education.50 
B. Charter School Structure and Procedures 
Until 1991, parents had three options for their children’s 
education: private school, traditional public school, or 
homeschool. In 1991, Minnesota became the first state to pass 
charter school legislation, introducing a fourth education option 
that promised to satisfy parental and state demand for higher 
quality and more diverse K–12 education.51 While charter 
schools are technically public schools because they receive state 
and federal funding, it is important to distinguish them from 
traditional public schools that are subject to much stricter state 
regulation.52 Since 1991, forty-two other states and the District 
of Columbia have passed charter school legislation.53 As of 
2014, there were over 6,500 charter schools throughout 
America.54 Between 1999 and 2016, student enrollment in 
charter schools has increased from 300,000 to 2.9 million.55 The 
 
 47 Davis, supra note 26, at 6; James Forman, Do Charter Schools Threaten, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 843 (2007). 
 48 Patrick J. Gallo, Reforming the “Business” of Charter Schools in Pennsylvania, 
2014 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 207, 208–09 (2014). 
 49 Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency, 
Accountability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 520–22 (2012). 
 50 David Groshoff, Uncharted Territory: Market Competition’s Constitutional 
Collision with Entrepreneurial Sex-Segregated Charter Schools, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 
307, 357 n.2 (2010). 
 51 Liu, supra note 4, at 276. 
 52 Davis, supra note 26, at 5. 
 53 Laws and Legislation, THE CENTER FOR EDUCATION REFORM, 
https://www.edreform.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/laws-legislation/ (last visited 
June 3, 2016). 
 54 Charter School Enrollment, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgb.asp (last visited June 3, 2016). 
 55 Id.; NATIONAL ALLIANCE, supra note 16. 
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rapid spread of charter schools in the wake of authorizing 
legislation is largely attributed to the bipartisan appeal of 
charter schools.56  
While states may statutorily permit “local districts, state 
departments of education, or universities” the ability to grant 
charters to specific groups outlined in their respective statutes, 
the chartering process itself varies greatly between states.57 
States often require that charters last for specific lengths of 
time as opposed to allowing them to continue in perpetuity.58 
Depending on the state, charter schools may be either nonprofit 
or for-profit. For example, several states including Arizona, 
Virginia, Colorado, and Wisconsin have enacted statutes that 
are silent on which form charter schools must choose.59 
However, the majority of charter schools operate as nonprofits, 
in part because many states require it.60 This Note will 
concentrate on nonprofit charter schools, as they constitute the 
bulk of charter schools. 
There are several further characteristics that define charter 
schools. Charter schools do not charge students tuition.61 In 
place of tuition, charter schools receive funding from the 
district and state based on the average daily attendance of 
pupils.62 States do not, however, provide charter schools with 
funding for facilities.63 Charter schools must rely on other 
 
 56 See Kathryn Kraft, Cyber Charter Schools—An Analysis of Their Legality, 56 
SMU L. REV. 2327, 2330 (2003) (“Republicans support charter schools because these 
schools provide competition to traditional public schools, operate without the burdens 
of state or local regulations, and must produce strong results in order to continue 
operating. Democrats support charter schools because they present a new approach to 
education while adhering to the core values of traditional public schools. Democrats 
admire charter schools’ innovative approaches to education and appreciate their open 
admissions process, free cost, and nonsectarian purpose. Most legislators believe these 
schools will provide flexibility and innovation for school curricula and increase parental 
involvement.”). 
 57 Morley, supra note 5, at 1787. 
 58 James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & 
CIV. LIBERTIES 393, 395 (2008). 
 59 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-183 (2002); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22.1-212.5–22.1-
212.16 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40(7)(3) (West 1999 & Supp. 
2002); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.101(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003). 
 60 See FLA. STAT. § 1002.33(18)(f) (2011); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-5(a) (West 
2006); PA. CONS. STAT. § 17-1702-A (2006). 
 61 About Charter Schools, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS, 
http://www.publiccharters.org/get-the-facts/public-charter-schools/ (last visited June 4, 
2016). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
Eastman.285-324.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/17 5:20 PM 
296 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2017 
means of securing a facility, such as grants, loans, 
philanthropic donations, or renting from EMOs.64 Most state 
laws preclude charter schools from choosing their students.65 
Instead, like their traditional public school equivalents, charter 
schools provide open enrollment to all students.66 In most 
states, if the number of applications a charter school receives 
exceeds the number of seats available, the school must use a 
lottery system to select students for enrollment.67  
Charter schools differ from traditional public schools in that 
states do not dictate whom charter schools can hire or what 
they teach.68 Charter schools are also “exempt from significant 
State or local rules that inhibit the flexible operation and 
management of public schools.”69 This autonomy tends to give 
charter schools free reign over resource and budget allocation, 
staffing, and curriculum creation and implementation.70 Many 
states still require charter schools to observe certain 
regulations concerning “class size, graduation, bilingual 
education, special education, health, safety, and civil rights.”71 
C. Charter School Benefits and Goals 
State governments hoped to revitalize K–12 education with 
charter school legislation by allowing teachers to employ the 
“dynamism and experimentation available in autonomous 
private schools” combined with public state funding available 
to public schools.72 Charter schools therefore inhabit a gray 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.; Charter School Procedures, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER 
SCHOOLS, http://www.publiccharters.org/law-database/clear-student-recruitment-
enrollment-lottery-procedures/ (last visited June 4, 2016). 
 66 Charter School Procedures, supra note 65. But see Valerie Strauss, How 
Charter School Choose Desirable Students, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/02/16/how-charter-
schools-choose-desirable-students/ (describing situations where many charter schools 
have been indirectly selecting students by setting barriers to admissions such as 
requiring students to submit long essays, mandatory family interviews, academic 
prerequisites, lengthy application forms, and assessment exams). 
 67 Charter School Procedures, supra note 65. 
 68 Morley, supra note 5, at 1788. 
 69 20 U.S.C.A. § 7221i(1)(E) (West 2003). 
 70 Liu, supra note 4, at 278. 
 71 Id. at 279. Under Illinois’ administrative code title 23 relating to special 
education, charter schools are to be treated as schools within school districts over 
which the board of education has jurisdiction. As such, charter schools must comply 
with the “special education” part of the code. Id. 
 72 Davis, supra note 26, at 8. 
Eastman.285-324.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/17 5:20 PM 
2] REGAINING TRUST 297 
area between wholly “public” and “private” schools by 
borrowing aspects of both and incorporating them into a single 
educational institution, but with the constraint of needing to 
“produce certain result[s] . . . set forth in each charter school’s 
charter.”73  
Beyond the purported educational advantages that states 
hope to achieve, there are several other charter school 
advantages. First is an enhanced ability of charter schools to 
attract resources.74 Outside of state and federal funding, 
nonprofit charter schools can receive supplemental resources in 
the form of volunteer staff and donated funds.75 Charter schools 
may then use these resources to advance their purpose and 
bridge any gaps in funding. Second, charter schools receive 
“localized governance.” This differs from the typically 
centralized traditional public school structure that can lead to 
student alienation and the removal of “authority for crucial 
decisions like curriculum design from those best positioned to 
make them.”76 In contrast to traditional public schools, charter 
schools tend to be smaller, and this encourages improved school 
governance and greater parental involvement in a child’s 
education.77 Charter authorizers can therefore design rules and 
academic performance standards tailored to a charter school’s 
student body.78 The decentralized nature of charter schools’ 
management also leads to greater accountability than is 
present in traditional public schools.79 Charter school 
authorizers, and not “of system aggregates” as is the case with 
traditional public schools, are responsible for the performance 
of individual charter schools. 80 As such, a charter school will 
not survive if it performs poorly because it cannot hide among 
the collective success of other schools in its school system.81 
Third, when schools in popular city districts are overcrowded, 
especially those districts where “at-risk” children reside, an 
 
 73 Monica Teixeira de Sousa, Compelling Honesty: Amending Charter School 
Enrollment Laws to Aid Society’s Most Vulnerable, 45 URB. LAW. 105, 135 n.2 (2013). 
 74 Morley, supra note 5, at 1814. 
 75 Id. at 1805. 
 76 Id. at 1815. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Walker Richmond, Charter School Accountability: Rhetoric, Results, and 
Ramifications, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 330, 340 (2004). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 341. 
 81 Id. 
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operator can apply to open a charter school in that area to 
alleviate the strain on an overloaded public school.82 Other 
purported benefits include desegregation and decreased need 
for spending resources on union contracts.83  
D. Charter School Performance and Purposes 
Results and opinions vary greatly as to whether nonprofit 
charter schools have succeeded in providing a better or more 
“innovative” public education in comparison to traditional 
public schools.84 The main issue with evaluating charter school 
success is that they differ substantially state-to-state.85 Two 
meta-analyses of several studies assessing charter school 
success found that making a broad conclusion about charter 
school success across America may be “premature.”86 However, 
a recent study comparing traditional public schools against 
charter schools across fifteen states and the District of 
Columbia concluded that the majority of charter schools 
evaluated did not do significantly better or worse overall than 
traditional public schools.87 Thus, charter schools do not 
necessarily provide “better” education than traditional public 
schools through “innovative” teaching methods or giving local 
community members greater control over education. Instead 
charter schools supply an education approximately on par with 
traditional public schools to communities with little or no 
access to other education options.88 While some charter schools 
exist solely to provide parents with educational institution 
options, charter schools also function essentially as education 
“gap-closers” aimed at “improving the outcomes of at-risk 
student populations.”89 
Having provided a thorough summary of the charter school 
movement, this Note will now offer an overview of for-profit 
EMOs that partially or fully operate nonprofit charter schools. 
 
 82 Liu, supra note 4, at 296–97. 
 83 Morley, supra note 5, at 1814. 
 84 Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency, 
Accountability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 527–31 (2012). 
 85 Charter Schools: Finding out the Facts: At a Glance, CENTER FOR PUBLIC 
EDUCATION (2010), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Organizing-a-
school/Charter-schools-Finding-out-the-facts-At-a-glance (last visited June 4, 2016). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Liu, supra note 4, at 295. 
 89 Id. 
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III. EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION OVERVIEW 
A. What Are For-Profit EMOs? 
EMOs are private for-profit businesses that contract mostly 
with charter schools to either operate them entirely or provide 
a wide range of services in exchange for a portion (or all) of the 
public funding that charter schools receive.90 Such services can 
include curriculum creation, hiring teachers, school 
management, and providing bulk teaching supplies like 
pencils, books, computers, and the like.91 EMOs are distinct 
from “vendors” that provide a narrow range of services such as 
legal services, accounting, benefits, and payroll.92 EMOs are 
also different than Charter Management Organizations 
(“CMOs”), which carry out similar functions to EMOs, but do 
not operate for-profit.93 The largest American EMOs include 
National Heritage Academies, Edison Learning Inc., and White 
Hat.94 While there was an explosive increase in the number of 
EMOs during the 1990s into the early 2000s, the emergence of 
new EMOs has slowed.95 EMOs are now beginning to 
consolidate, resulting in a greater number of charter schools 
being run by large EMOs.96 As of 2016, EMOs ran 995 charter 
schools in the United States, which is approximately 15% of all 
charter schools.97 
Charter schools and EMOs enter into operation contracts 
that outline the relationship between the parties.98 Operation 
contracts vary in describing what services the EMO will 
provide, but they are generally used as an accountability 
measure to track the EMO’s fiscal responsibility and progress 
 
 90 Kary Moss, The Right to Read, 15 J.L. SOC’Y 187, 206 (2014) (“Charter schools 
account for nearly 93.9% for all EMO-managed schools.”). 
 91 Lewis D. Solomon, Edison Schools and the Privatization of K-12 Public 
Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1281, 1284 (2003). 
 92 Matthew D. Bernstein, Whose Choice Are We Talking About? The Exclusion of 
Students with Disabilities from For-Profit Online Charter Schools, 16 RICH. J.L. & PUB. 
INT. 487, 501 (2013). 
 93 Sean Sandoloski, Profiting on America’s Youth? A Study of Educational 
Management Organizations, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 199, 204 (2011). 
 94 Miron, supra note 34, at 478. 
 95 Id. at 5. 
 96 Anne E. Trotter, Education Management Organizations and Charter Schools: 
Serving All Students, 213 EDUC. LAW REP. 935, 940–41 (2006). 
 97 NATIONAL ALLIANCE, supra note 16. 
 98 Trotter, supra note 96, 23. 
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toward improving student body performance.99 When the 
contract is close to its expiration date, the charter school can 
examine whether the EMO met the benchmarks laid out in the 
contract and decide whether to continue partnering with the 
EMO. EMOs typically do not hold the charter originally 
granted to the charter school operators.100 However, few EMO 
contracts allow charter school boards to own the charter 
school’s physical property.101 Instead, many contracts state that 
the EMO owns the school’s physical assets.102 The EMO will 
then typically lease the property back to the charter school.103 
B. What Are the Benefits and Shortcomings of EMOs in the 
Nonprofit Charter School Movement? 
There are several arguments in favor of EMOs partnering 
with charter schools. First, EMOs allow charter schools to take 
advantage of economies of scale.104 That is, EMOs are able to 
bargain with vendors when purchasing lunch service for use 
throughout all of the charter schools an EMO operates, and 
EMOs can negotiate for lower prices when buying textbooks or 
computers in bulk, thus spending less money per pupil.105 
Second, as newer players in the education field, EMOs are 
better positioned to experiment with and tweak different 
programs that allow for happier teachers and better educated 
students than the entrenched procedures present in many 
traditional public school systems and other sub-standard 
independent charter schools.106 Third, EMOs provide enhanced 
accountability.107 If parents or charter schools do not like an 
EMO’s progress toward improving student education, parents 
can withdraw their children and charter schools can end their 
contract after the contract’s term ends.108 Finally, EMOs 
provide expert assistance in addressing major problems that 
 
 99 Gary Miron, Education Management Organizations 2 (2007), 
http://a100educationalpolicy.pbworks.com/f/EMO_History.pdf. 
 100 Bernstein, supra note 92, at 501. 
 101 Nelson, supra note 7, at 276. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Sandoloski, supra note 93, at 203. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 206; Trotter, supra note 96, at 936. 
 107 Trotter, supra note 96, at 936. 
 108 Id. 
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new charter schools face such as “overwhelm[ing] . . . 
paperwork, securing facilities, financial management, and 
overall lack of resources.”109 
There are also several shortcomings to EMOs contracting 
with nonprofit charter schools. One of the main issues with for-
profit EMOs is their inclination toward maximizing 
shareholder wealth, a common primary goal in the for-profit 
sector.110 This principle is problematic specifically for EMOs in 
the education sector, because delivering increased shareholder 
and investor profits may force EMOs to choose a lower-cost 
means of educating students in charter schools that negatively 
impacts the quality of education the students receive, or EMOs 
may engage in questionable business practices to deliver 
returns.111 An analogy can be drawn between EMO-charter 
school partnerships and the pitfalls of the for-profit college 
(“FPC”) business model, which has been under media and 
government fire for the past decade following allegations of 
“financial aid fraud, gross misrepresentations to students, and 
deceptive business practices.”112 FPCs accrue money in a 
similar way to EMOs, except FPC money comes from federal 
student loans and GI Bill grants instead of from public funds 
redirected from traditional public schools, with federal 
financial aid providing over $20 billion to FPCs every year.113 
Like EMOs, FPCs differ from their state-run counterparts in 
that the former are largely directed by publically traded 
companies or private equity firms, and the latter are largely 
directed by trustees primarily motivated by educational 
outcome.114 One well-known FPC, the University of Phoenix, 
spent $400,000 a day on advertising in 2012.115 The reason 
 
 109 Miron, supra note 99. 
 110 Conn, supra note 9, at 254. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Aarmer Madhani, New Federal Rules Target For-Profit Colleges, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 17, 2014, 1:48 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/13/obama-for-profit-college-
regulations/6386565/; Rebecca E. Reif, Knowledge Is Power: Reform of For-Profit 
Educational Institutions on an Individual and Institutional Level, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 
251, 253 (2012). 
 113 Sarah Anne Schade, Reining in the Predatory Nature of For-Profit Colleges, 56 
ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 328 (2014). 
 114 Id. at 322; Maura Dundon, Students or Consumers? For-Profit Colleges and 
the Practical and Theoretical Role of Consumer Protection, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
375, 376 (2015). 
 115 Schade, supra note 113, at 323. 
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FPCs spend such large amounts of money on advertising is to 
target one demographic: “vulnerable populations, including the 
underemployed and out-of-work, military personnel and their 
families, low-income students with no prior college experience, 
community college students, and minorities.”116 By targeting 
these vulnerable populations, FPCs can increase enrollment 
and multiply the amount of money FPCs receive in the form of 
federal student loans, which they then use to expand their 
operations and maximize shareholder and investor profits.117 
FPCs tout many of the same advantages that EMOs advertise, 
such as flexibility in meeting student needs.118 The FPC’s main 
selling point is that they claim to teach students “skilled 
trades” or “vocational skills,” making students job-ready upon 
graduation.119  
In recent years, FPCs have been plagued with poor results 
and engaging in fraudulent activities, such as deceptive 
marketing practices.120 Much like EMO and charter school 
partnerships, some commentators argue that in theory, FPCs 
can be beneficial in the education field because they can help 
“nontraditional students successfully complete college 
programs with workplace skills that enable them to get good 
jobs in a tough economy.”121 However, like with EMOs, reform 
is necessary to prevent further exploitation of students and 
federal government financial aid.122 In the case of FPCs, 
commentators argue that the government should be more 
selective when allocating student loans to students attending 
FPCs, because although for-profit students make up only 11% 
of the higher education population, they account for 44% of all 
federal student loan defaults.123 The result of government 
intervention for FPCs was the reduction of their main stream 
of income—namely, federal student loans. In order to avoid a 
similar result, EMOs could learn from the situation currently 
facing FPCs and rebrand themselves as benefit corporations to 
 
 116 Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal Reform of the For-Profit 
Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515, 528–29 (2012). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 525. 
 119 See Reif, supra note 112, at 275. 
 120 Dundon, supra note 114, at 377. 
 121 Reif, supra note 112, at 275. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Note, Forgive and Forget: Bankruptcy Reform in the Context of For-Profit 
Colleges, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2018, 2019 (2015). 
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mitigate the increased government and media scrutiny. 
Although in theory charter school administrators may end 
contracts with EMOs if the EMO does not perform well in 
carrying out the contract’s terms, there are problems and costs 
associated with ending a contract that may dissuade a charter 
school from terminating the agreement.124 These include the 
availability of adequate replacement EMOs, the cost involved 
in searching for and switching to a different EMO, whether the 
charter school has available funds to contract with another 
EMO, the loss of property to the EMO that the charter school 
administrators leased to house their student body, and 
intertwinement of charter school board members with the 
managing EMO.125 Another drawback occurs in situations 
where an EMO fully operates a charter school. In such cases, 
EMOs may have a tendency to assert their authority over 
charter schools in such a way that they interrupt the charter 
school’s founding principles.126  
Aside from the shareholder wealth-maximization axiom and 
the difficulty exiting from contracts with EMOs, there is one 
overarching problem that has brought EMOs into the national 
spotlight: misusing public funding that charter schools pay for-
profit EMOs in exchange for operating the charter school. 
Misusing public funding has resulted in states banning EMOs 
from contracting with charter schools.127 This Note will now 
examine two specific instances where for-profit EMOs have 
either misused taxpayer money or are not transparent about 
how they spend taxpayer money. These instances highlight the 
need for EMOs to become benefit corporations as a means of 
increasing accountability and showing state legislatures that 
EMOs are serious about both making profits and advancing 
charter school education. The first scenario concerns auditors 
who are not able to track how EMOs have spent the taxpayer 
money that charter schools pay EMOs. The second situation is 
where EMOs have inflated charter school rent, sometimes 
redirecting over one-third of a charter school’s funding to pay 
 
 124 Katrina E. Bulkley, Losing Voice? Educational Management Organizations 
and Charter Schools’ Educational Programs, 37 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y. 204, 228–230 
(2005). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Trotter, supra note 96, at 941–42. 
 127 See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER SCHOOL CENTER, supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
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rent for the charter school’s facilities.  
C. Examples of EMOs Misusing Taxpayer Money 
1. A lack of transparency when tracking how EMOs spend 
charter school money  
The majority of EMOs are private companies, and, as such, 
once public funds pass from the charter school to the EMO, 
regulators, auditors, and charter schools are unable to track 
how the EMO spends the money.128 This is because, as private 
companies, EMOs are not subject to many of the public 
disclosures and transparency rules that other public entities, 
such as traditional public schools, must observe.129 A lack of 
transparency is especially troublesome for charter schools that 
enter into contracts where a charter school hands over a 
substantial amount of its funding, usually between 95 and 
100%, to the EMO.130 In 2010, New York state auditors tried to 
track $10 million in taxpayer public funding that passed 
through Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School in New York City 
into National Heritage Academies, a large for-profit EMO that 
the charter school had contracted with for full operation and 
management services.131 The auditors concluded that they were 
“unable to verify the true cost of Excelsior’s operations or 
determine the extent to which the $10 million of annual public 
funding provided to the school was actually used to benefit its 
students” because National Heritage, claiming they were 
“proprietary, refused to provide financial reports.”132 Excelsior’s 
lack of transparency as to how the EMO they contracted with 
spent public funding is an all-too-common phenomenon in the 
EMO-charter school partnership world, and is partly 
responsible for the legislative and media backlash against such 
partnerships.133 By rebranding as benefit corporations, EMO 
 
 128 Wang, supra note 32, at 2. 
 129 Parker Baxter et al., Public Accountability & Transparency of Charter Schools 
& Management Organizations (2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/APCSA-Public-Accountability-One-Page.pdf. 
 130 Wang, supra note 32, at 2. 
 131 Thomas P. DiNapoli, New York State Office of the State Comptroller Division 
of State Government Accountability, Oversight of Financial Operations: Brooklyn 
Excelsior Charter School 5 (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093013/11s14.pdf. 
 132 Id. 
 133 DeJarnatt, supra note 2, at 58–66. 
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transparency would be mandatory. EMOs could use their 
rebranding efforts to separate themselves from those EMOs 
that refuse to share their financial records with auditors. This 
could lessen the chance that state legislatures ban EMO-
charter school partnerships.  
2. EMOs are charging charter schools inflated rent and 
creating conflicts of interest  
Real estate transactions involving inflated rent and 
conflicts of interest constitute the bulk of dishonest business 
dealings that have facilitated government scrutiny when it 
comes to EMO-charter school contracts. Real estate makes up a 
substantial portion of the profits that EMOs receive when 
partnering with charter schools.134 Charter schools that partner 
with EMOs usually do not own their facilities.135 Instead, 
charter schools that partner with EMOs rent school facilities 
from the EMO.136 Most EMO-charter school property 
transactions follow a similar set of steps as depicted below. 
First, the EMO will purchase or build a facility for the charter 
school.137 The EMO will improve the facility and then sell it at 
a profit.138 The EMO then leases the property back from the 
buyer, and subleases the property to a charter school, making a 
profit by charging far more than the EMO’s lease payments.139  
140 
 
 134 Id. at 47. 
 135 Bernstein, supra note 92, at 501. 
 136 Candisky, supra note 15. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Flowchart created by the author using www.draw.io. The dollar amounts are 
used for ease to track how EMOs are able to profit from real estate transactions with 
charter schools. These transactions will typically run into the hundreds of thousands to 
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In some cases, the EMO will simply hold onto the property 
and charge the charter schools far in excess of the EMO’s 
mortgage payments.141 In many cases, the EMO will calculate 
rents to obtain maximum reimbursement from state public 
funding instead of reflecting the property’s fair market value.142  
There are two troubling scenarios where EMO-charter 
school facility rental agreements are concerned. In the first, 
EMOs sometimes charge charter schools inflated rent.143 
Typically, charter schools should not allocate more than 20% of 
their operating budget to renting their facilities.144 However, in 
some cases charter schools give over one-third of their 
operating costs to EMO landlords.145 By spending excessive 
amounts on rent, charter schools spend less money on student 
instruction. The second troubling scenario occurs where there 
are conflicts of interest between EMO operators and charter 
school operators concerning rental agreements.146 In 2014, the 
U.S. Department of Education investigated Florida’s largest 
EMO, Academica Corp., for potential conflicts of interest in its 
business dealings with Mater Academy charter schools.147 The 
audit found that Academica had created the original nonprofit 
Mater Academy in 1998. Since then, several schools in the 
Mater network entered into lease agreements with 
development companies tied to Academica, thereby filtering 
public funding through nonprofit charter schools into the for-
profit EMO.148 Audits in other states, including Pennsylvania, 
have found similar conflicts of interest involved in real estate 
agreements.149 Real estate transactions involving inflated rent 
 
millions of dollars in actual transactions. 
 141 Jennifer Dixon, Michigan’s Biggest Charter Operator Charges Big Rents: 14 
Schools Pay $1M, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 22, 2014, 1:50 AM), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2014/06/22/michigans-biggest-charter-
operator-charges-big-rents-14-schools-pay/77155250/. 
 142 DeJarnatt, supra note 2, at 73. 
 143 Rawls, supra note 12. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Dixon, supra note 141; DeJarnatt, supra note 2, at 73. 
 146 Davis, supra note 26, at 13. For example, the former chairwoman for a charter 
school negotiated with an EMO that she had multiple family ties with, including a 
lease agreement which obligated the charter school to pay $98,000 a month for a school 
building. Id. 
 147 McGrory, supra note 6. 
 148 Id. 
 149 FRAUD & SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, REVIEW OF 
CHARTER SCHOOL OVERSIGHT: A FRAUD VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT J-4 (Apr. 2010), 
http://www.philadelphiacontroller.org/publications/other%20reports/CharterSchoolInve
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and conflicts of interest constitute the bulk of dishonest 
business dealings that have facilitated government scrutiny 
when it comes to EMO-charter school contracts, and have 
highlighted a greater need for EMO transparency in order to 
prevent states banning their partnerships with charter schools.  
IV. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS: THE PATH TO RESTORING TRUST 
IN EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND NONPROFIT 
CHARTER SCHOOL AFFILIATIONS 
In light of this need for greater accountability and 
transparency among EMOs in order to prevent states from 
banning their association with charter schools, the benefit 
corporation offers EMOs the opportunity to rebrand and show 
that they can do good while generating profits.150 In a post-
Enron world where there is a growing dissatisfaction with the 
corporate landscape, benefit corporation legislation offers 
several benefits of which current and future EMOs can take 
advantage.151 First, benefit corporations have amplified 
accountability. Thus, by branding themselves as benefit 
corporations, EMOs can increase transparency that the benefit 
corporation structure requires.152 Second, benefit-corporation 
branding allows EMOs to make up for the investors they may 
lose. A double- or triple-bottom line approach that capitalizes 
on “socially responsible investment trends” may compensate for 
lost investors.153  
A. Why Was the Benefit Corporation Created and What Are 
Benefit Corporations? 
1. Why was the benefit corporation created? 
The benefit corporation was created as a means of offering 
social enterprises the legal protection and certainty that they 
required to pursue a “dual mission”: advancing a social goal 
while generating financial returns for investors and 
 
stigation_FullReport.pdf. 
 150 Resor, supra note 36, at 91. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 153 Sarah Thornsberry, More Burden Than Benefit? Analysis of the Benefit 
Corporation Movement in California, 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 159, 184 
(2013). 
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shareholders.154 Instead of pursuing a single bottom line, social 
enterprises sought to pursue a triple bottom line, “pursuing not 
only economic prosperity, but also environmental quality and 
social good.”155 Before states passed benefit corporation 
legislation, groups seeking to pursue a public mission generally 
had two choices of business entity.  
The first choice offers social enterprises the opportunity to 
become traditional for-profit corporations. The corporate form 
affords businesses certain benefits, such as limited director 
liability, transferability of stock, and the ability to raise capital 
easily.156 However, for-profit corporations generally follow the 
shareholder maximization norm that pervades the for-profit 
sector, while eschewing decisions that consider other interests 
at the expense of shareholder profits.157 While the holdings in 
two famous corporate law cases, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.158 and 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,159 are commonly 
understood as requiring directors to consider only shareholder 
profits while prohibiting directors and managers from 
contemplating other socially beneficial objectives, this 
interpretation misconstrues the current state of corporate law 
and the reason behind the shareholder maximization axiom.160 
The heart of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (“Model 
 
 154 J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit 
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for 
Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 88–89 (2012). See Robert Katz, The Role of Social 
Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 86 (2010) (defining “social enterprise” as an entity having 
profit-making goals while also embracing the duty to sometimes make decisions that 
will not maximize profit and sharing some of the social aims of a nonprofit corporation). 
 155 Thornsberry, supra note 153, at 163. 
 156 See Stephen G. Christianson, Liability of a Director to a Corporation for 
Mismanagement, 29 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 133, § 10; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
102(b)(7); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151. 
 157 Resor, supra note 36, at 95. 
 158 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 159 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 160 Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. 
WASH L. REV 121, 154–55 (2016); see eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d 1 (“When 
director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this Court will not 
question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it 
through making a charitable contribution, paying employees higher salaries and 
benefits, or more general norms like promoting a particular corporate culture—
ultimately promote stockholder value.” What is unclear from this ruling is whether the 
business judgment rule will protect directors when they promote non-shareholder 
interests without tying that decision into how promoting non-shareholder values will 
promote shareholder value. This is the gray area the benefit corporation seeks to 
resolve by specifically allowing benefit corporations to pursue both a social mission and 
profit generation.); see also Dodge, 170 N.W. 668. 
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Legislation”) is premised on the misconception that Dodge and 
eBay Domestic Holdings hold that directors must maximize the 
corporation’s financial value.161 However, these two cases 
actually allow directors to consider broader stakeholder 
interests if directors can justify such considerations with any 
“rational business purpose.”162 Although the business judgment 
rule generally protects directors of for-profit corporations from 
shareholder and judicial questioning of business decisions that 
are “rationally connected to shareholder benefit,” any decision 
that lacks this causation could leave directors open to 
lawsuits.163 As such, the justification for benefit corporations 
does not stem from a legally enforced shareholder 
maximization norm that prevents groups from considering the 
interests of other stakeholders, such as employees, at the 
expense of shareholder pecuniary interests, because such a 
prohibition does not exist in corporate law.164 Instead, benefit 
corporations are justified because of uncertainty surrounding 
the “interplay between the duty of loyalty and managerial 
discretion.”165  
This uncertainty plays out in not knowing how much 
latitude managers and directors have in making decisions that 
benefit stakeholders other than shareholders.166 As such, the 
benefit corporation creates a new corporate form that 
eliminates legal uncertainties present in for-profit 
corporations, and not only allows but mandates that managers 
and directors balance various stakeholder interests when 
making business decisions.167 One corporate form in particular, 
the limited liability company (“LLC”), has been a popular 
choice for social enterprises in lieu of the benefit corporation 
because it offers structural and organizational flexibility, such 
as the single taxation available to partnerships combined with 
 
 161 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEG. § 301 (Apr. 2016). 
 162 Tu, supra note 160, at 155. 
 163 J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and Statutory Design, 
26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143, 144–45 (2014); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (The 
business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”). 
 164 Kyle Westaway, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic Analysis with 
Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1012 (2013). 
 165 Tu, supra note 160, at 155. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
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the limited liability that a corporation’s directors enjoy.168 But 
LLCs lack an accountability structure that allows shareholders 
to check that the LLC is advancing the social enterprise’s social 
mission.169  
A social enterprise could also become a nonprofit 
corporation. Nonprofit corporations exist to provide “public 
goods” in situations where contract failure has occurred.170 The 
nonprofit entity is aligned with a social enterprise’s goal of 
advancing a social good.171 But a social enterprise would not be 
able to generate profits for shareholders because nonprofits are 
prohibited from distributing profits, nor can they have 
shareholders.172 Instead, any earnings that are not paid for 
“services rendered to the organization . . . must be retained and 
devoted in their entirety to financing further production of the 
services that the organization was formed to provide.”173 With 
the advent of the benefit corporation, social enterprises now 
have a third option: a new type of legal entity that combines 
the nonprofit corporation’s goal of “making the world . . . a 
better place” with the traditional for-profit corporation’s goal of 
producing profits for shareholders and investors.174 
2. What is the benefit corporation? 
In 2010, B Lab, a nonprofit corporation whose mission is “to 
use the power of business to solve social and environmental 
problems,” promulgated the Model Legislation that allows the 
formation of benefit corporations as legal corporate entities.175 
 
 168 Anna R. Kimbrell, Benefit Corporation Legislation: An Opportunity for Kansas 
to Welcome Social Enterprises, 62 U. KAN. L. 549, 554 (2013); Thornsberry, supra note 
153, at 171. 
 169 Thornsberry, supra note 153, at 171. 
 170 JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
28–30 (5th ed. 2015) (“Contract failure” occurs in situations where “ordinary 
contractual devices in themselves do not provide consumers with adequate means for 
policing the performance of producers. In such situations, the nonprofit form offers 
consumers the protection of another, broader ‘contract’—namely, the organization’s 
commitment, through its nonprofit charter, to devote all of its income to the services it 
was formed to provide.”). 
 171 Callison, supra note 163, at 145. 
 172 FISHMAN, supra note 170, at 4. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1010 (2013). 
 175 About B Lab, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/about-b-lab (last visited June 5, 2016) (The B Lab Certification merely indicates 
that the corporation meets B Lab’s standards). 
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Since 2010, thirty-one states have passed benefit corporation 
legislation largely based on the Model Legislation.176 As of May 
2016, approximately 3,188 businesses have incorporated as 
benefit corporations throughout the thirty-one states that have 
benefit corporation statutes.177 Benefit corporations should not 
be confused with B Corps, which are not legal entities.178 B 
Corp status is awarded to corporations that have passed B 
Lab’s “B Lab Certification” process, which measures the 
corporation’s social and environmental performance, 
transparency, and legal accountability against B Lab’s third-
party standards.179  
Benefit corporations are for-profit corporations “with a 
stated public benefit” requiring the corporation’s managers and 
directors to balance (i) maximizing shareholder profits, (ii) the 
best interests of stakeholders materially affected by the 
corporation’s conduct, and (iii) the corporation’s stated public 
benefit.180 The general public benefit that a benefit corporation 
must consider is defined in the Model Legislation as “[a] 
material positive impact on society and the environment, taken 
as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the 
business and operations of a benefit corporation.”181 Although 
benefit corporation statutes differ between the states, they all 
share three major obligations:  
A benefit corporation: (1) has the corporate purpose to create 
a material, positive impact on society and the environment; 
(2) expands fiduciary duty to require consideration of 
nonfinancial interests; and (3) reports on its overall social and 
environmental performance as assessed against a 
 
 176 State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORPORATION, 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited June 5, 2016). 
 177 Find a Benefit Corp, BENEFIT CORPORATION, 
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-
corp?field_bcorp_certified_value=&state=&title=&submit2=Go&sort_by=title&sort_ord
er=ASC&op=Go (last visited June 5, 2016). 
 178 Matthew J. Dulac, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit 
Corporations and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 174 (2015). 
 179 Why B Corps Matter, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-
b-corps/why-b-corps-matter (last visited June 5, 2016). 
 180 Dulac, supra note 178, at 175; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §362(a). 
 181 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEG. § 102. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2014) 
(Delaware’s “Public Benefit Corporation” differs significantly from the Model 
Legislation promulgated by B Labs in that Delaware requires corporations to identify 
in its certificate of incorporation a specific public benefit that it will promote. But 
Delaware does not require its public benefit corporations to use a third-party standard 
when creating reports.). 
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comprehensive, credible, independent, and transparent third-
party standard.182  
Benefit corporations therefore differ from traditional for-
profit corporations in that benefit corporations are required to 
consider the impact that their decisions have on society and 
other stakeholders as well as shareholders.183 Thus, when 
people invest in benefit corporations, they can obtain stock 
price gains and dividends, but shareholders acknowledge that 
producing a public good may reduce profitability.184 
Instead of benefit corporation legislation creating a new 
body of law, the statutes work in tandem with a state’s 
corporate law to allow corporations to form as benefit 
corporations.185 As such, a state’s corporate statutes continue to 
apply except where the benefit corporation statute specifically 
displaces general incorporation statutes.186 Some states have 
tweaked B Lab’s Model Legislation when passing their own 
benefit corporation legislation, but the majority of states closely 
follow B Lab’s Model Legislation.187 Two states in particular, 
Delaware and Colorado, have adopted statutes with significant 
changes to the Model Legislation that set them apart from the 
majority of states that have adopted statutes closely aligned 
with the Model Legislation.188 Despite the changes, Delaware 
and Colorado seek to institute the same principles underlying 
the Model Legislation.189 Because many businesses select 
Delaware as their state of incorporation, this Subpart will first 
compare the key differences between the Model Legislation and 
 
 182 Jacob E. Hasler, Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corporations Empower 
Investors and Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (2014). 
 183 Joseph Karl Grant, When Making Money and Making a Sustainable and 
Societal Difference Collide: Will Benefit Corporations Succeed or Fail?, 46 IND. L. REV. 
581 (2013). 
 184 Callison, supra note 163, at 145. 
 185 Hasler, supra note 182, at 1286. 
 186 Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit 
Corps, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 279 (2013). 
 187 See Loewenstein, supra note 174, at 1013 (For example, New Jersey’s benefit 
corporation statute has a provision that says “If a benefit corporation has not delivered 
a benefit report to the department for a period of two years, the department may 
prepare and file a statement that the corporation has forfeited its status as a benefit 
corporation.” This provision does not exist in the Model Legislation.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
14A:18-11 (West). 
 188 Kevin Ercoline, Beyond Puffery, Providing Shareholder Assurance of Societal 
Good Will in Crowdfunded Benefit Corporations, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 169, 189 n.70 
(2014). 
 189 Id. 
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Delaware’s benefit corporation legislation and suggest which 
approach EMOs should choose. 190 And then this Subpart will 
explore why EMOs should become benefit corporations. 
B. Comparing the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation 
with Delaware’s “Public Benefit Corporation” Statute as 
a Means of Deciding Which Statute Would Benefit EMOs 
the Most 
B Labs are the foremost advocates of benefit corporations 
and they created the Model Legislation to assist states in 
creating their own benefit corporation statutes. Delaware has 
enacted its own version of the Model Legislation.191 The two 
approaches differ in relation to the flexibility they allow 
corporations, with the Delaware approach being more flexible 
than the Model Legislation. This Subpart will now provide 
overviews of the main provisions in each statute, suggest which 
approach EMOs should adopt, and why EMOs should consider 
becoming benefit corporations.  
1. Overview: Elements of the Model Benefit Corporation 
approach 
A newly formed benefit corporation’s articles of 
incorporation must state that it is a benefit corporation.192 An 
existing corporation may become a benefit corporation by 
amending its articles of incorporation to state that it is a 
benefit corporation, and to be effective, the amendment must 
be adopted by a “minimum status vote.”193 A benefit corporation 
must create a “general public benefit” in addition to the 
corporation’s purpose under the state’s corporate law.194 A 
“general public benefit” is defined as a “material positive 
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, 
assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and 
 
 190 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: 
Who’s Opting In?, 14. U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 248 (2014). 
 191 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362. 
 192 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 103 (2016). 
 193 Id. at § 104; see id. § 102 (defining “minimum status vote” as requiring the 
“affirmative vote of the shareholders of each class or series entitled to cast at least two-
thirds of the votes that all shareholders of the class or series are entitled to cast on the 
action”). 
 194 Id. at § 201(a). 
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operations of a benefit corporation.”195 The Model Legislation 
does not state who is to apply the third-party standard. A 
benefit corporation may also state a “specific public interest,” 
but this is not a requirement under the Model Legislation.196  
The benefit corporation’s board of directors must “consider 
the effects of any action or inaction upon”: (i) shareholders, (ii) 
employees, (iii) customers “as beneficiaries of the general 
public benefit or a specific public benefit purpose of the benefit 
corporation,” and (iv) societal factors and community, including 
communities where the benefit corporation’s offices, facilities, 
subsidiaries or its suppliers are located.197 The Model 
Legislation does not prioritize any particular interest for 
directors to consider and there is no guidance on this matter. 
Further, directors are not liable for monetary damages if the 
benefit corporation fails to pursue or create a general or 
specific public benefit, which means that only equitable 
remedies are available to plaintiffs.198 The business judgment 
rule protects a director’s business decision with respect to 
considering the interests of the various benefit corporation 
stakeholders if the director is (i) not interested in the decision’s 
subject, (ii) is informed about the subject of the business 
judgment, and (iii) “rationally believes” the business judgment 
is in the benefit corporation’s best interests.199 
A “benefit enforcement proceeding” is any claim for a 
benefit corporation’s failure to pursue or create general public 
benefit or specific public benefit purpose in its articles of 
incorporation, or for violation of statutory obligation, duty, or 
standard.200 Benefit enforcement proceedings may only be 
commenced or maintained directly by the benefit corporation or 
derivatively.201 Further, the only parties who may bring a 
benefit enforcement proceeding are (i) a person or group that 
 
 195 Id. at § 102(a) (“Third party standard” is a “recognized standard for defining, 
reporting, and assessing corporate social and environmental performance” that is 
“comprehensive,” developed by an entity not controlled by the benefit corporation, 
“credible,” and “transparent.”). 
 196 Id. at § 201(b); id. at § 102 (Examples include “providing low-income or 
underserved individuals or communities with beneficial products or services . . . 
promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge . . . [and] conferring any 
other particular benefit on society or the environment.”). 
 197 Id. at § 301(a). 
 198 Id. at § 301(c). 
 199 Id. at § 301(e). 
 200 Id. at § 102(2). 
 201 Id. 
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owns at least two percent of the total shares outstanding at the 
time of the omission or act complained of; (ii) a director; (iii) a 
person or group owning five percent of equity interests in the 
corporation’s parent corporation; or (iv) other persons identified 
in the articles of incorporation or benefit corporation’s 
bylaws.202 This means that although directors must balance the 
interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, those 
stakeholders do not have standing to sue a benefit corporation 
derivatively for failing to create or pursue public benefits. 
Benefit corporations must prepare annual benefit reports 
that satisfy many requirements, including a narrative 
description of ways the corporation fulfilled its general public 
benefit, the extent to which the corporation created the public 
benefit, and any circumstances that obstructed the creation of 
the general public benefit.203 The narrative must also include 
an evaluation of the benefit corporation’s overall environmental 
and social performance against a third-party standard and the 
compensation paid to each of the corporation’s directors.204 The 
benefit corporation must send the annual report to each 
shareholder and post the report on the public portion of the 
corporation’s website.205 
2. The main differences between the Model Legislation and 
Delaware approaches 
There are two main differences between the Model 
Legislation and Delaware’s statute. Delaware refers to benefit 
corporations as “public benefit corporations” (“PBCs”). Further, 
Delaware’s PBC statute is far less restrictive than the Model 
Legislation.206 Instead of mandating that PBCs comply with 
certain provisions, the Delaware statute clarifies the fiduciary 
duties of the board of directors by expanding their ability to 
balance various interests. The Delaware statute then expressly 
allows PBCs to adopt many of the provisions in the statute, but 
leaves implementation up to the PBC.207 Delving deeper into 
 
 202 Id. at § 301(c). 
 203 Id. at § 401(a). 
 204 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a) (2016). 
 205 Id. at § 401(a)-(c). 
 206 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)(1) (2015). See Plerhoples, supra note 190, at 
254. 
 207 J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit 
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 352 (2014). 
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Delaware’s statute reveals several other significant features 
that distinguish it from the Model Legislation.  
First, Delaware PBCs are required to state a specific public 
benefit in their charter, and not a general public benefit.208 
Requiring PBCs to identify a specific public benefit was 
intended to “provide focus to the directors . . . and [to give] 
investors notice of, and some control over, specific public 
purposes the corporation serves.”209  
Second, where the Model Legislation requires directors to 
“consider” the interests of shareholders and beneficiaries of the 
benefit corporation’s public interest, PBCs are required to 
“balance the [1] pecuniary interests of the stockholders, [2] the 
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s 
conduct, and [3] the specific public benefit or public benefits 
identified in its certificate of incorporation.”210 “Balance” is 
arguably a stronger term and a more burdensome hurdle for 
directors to overcome than the Model Legislation’s use of 
“consider.”211 However, there is vast disagreement over the 
intended meaning of “consider” and “balance” by their 
respective authors and what effect the difference between these 
two terms will have.212  
Third, PBCs are not required to assess their public benefit 
using a third-party standard.213 Fourth, Delaware requires 
PBCs to create a “statement as to the corporation’s promotion 
of the public benefit” once every two years instead of 
annually.214 Further, PBCs only need to provide the report to 
shareholders. They are not required to post it on the public 
portion of their websites.215 The shareholder statement must 
contain (i) the objectives the directors established to promote a 
public benefit, (ii) the standards the directors created to 
 
 208 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)(2) (2015). 
 209 Murray, supra note 207, at 370 n.153. 
 210 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2013). 
 211 Id. 
 212 Murray, supra note 207, at 355. 
 213 Michael A. Hacker, “Profit, People, Planet” Perverted: Holding Benefit 
Corporations Accountable to Intended Beneficiaries, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1747, 1780 (2016) 
(“Some argue that inclusion of a third-party standard setter negates the possibility of 
the creation of nominal benefit corporations designed to “cash in on the cachet of being 
perceived as ‘green’ when the corporations are not actually creating any public 
benefits.”). 
 214 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2013) (But the statute allows for PBCs to 
require themselves to provide statements more frequently). 
 215 Id. 
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measure the corporation’s progress in promoting a public 
benefit, (iii) whether the PBC was objectively successful in 
promoting a public benefit, and (iv) an assessment of the PBC’s 
success in promoting a public benefit.216  
Fifth, Delaware’s statute does not provide any type of 
“benefit enforcement proceeding” to compel PBCs to pursue 
their specific public benefit.217 This omission may imply that a 
derivative lawsuit is the preferred action against a PBC’s 
directors for failing to pursue a public benefit.218  
Finally, the Delaware statute explicitly provides protections 
for directors where directors are assumed to meet their 
fiduciary duties, and allows for PBCs to have a § 102(b)(7) 
exculpation clause “eliminating or limiting the personal 
liability of a director to the corporation” concerning the 
directors’ good faith obligation.219 
3. Evaluating the Model Legislation and Delaware 
approaches, and deciding which approach EMOs should 
adopt 
Like all legislation, benefit corporation statutes are 
imperfect. They are also still in their infancy.220 As of May 
2016, no plaintiff has brought a lawsuit to force a benefit 
corporation or PBC to pursue its stated public benefit. There is 
no case law concerning these new entities. However, in 
evaluating which approach EMOs should choose, it is 
important to keep in mind the purpose for which EMOs should 
become benefit corporations. The primary reason is neither 
puffery nor to make empty promises about avoiding financial 
mismanagement. It is to create positive branding that states 
can rely on when deciding whether to allow EMOs to continue 
operating. In essence, benefit corporation branding would 
signal to a state that the EMO is committed to providing 
charter schools with expertise and economic savings to improve 
student body education. It would allow the EMO to 
 
 216 Id. 
 217 See Tu, supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 218 Plerhoples, supra note 190, at 257. 
 219 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(c) (2013). 
 220 Sean W. Brownridge, Canning Plum Organics: The Avant-Garde Campbell 
Soup Company Acquisition and Delaware Public Benefit Corporations Wandering 
Revlon-Land, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 703, 711 (2015) Maryland and Vermont were the first 
states to pass benefit corporation legislation in 2010. Id. 
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acknowledge that it wants to make a profit, while agreeing not 
to do so to the charter school’s financial detriment. 
In terms of increasing EMO accountability, the Model 
Legislation’s approach to annual reporting that is posted on the 
public portion of the benefit corporation’s website is more 
robust than Delaware’s biennial requirement. Delaware’s 
approach means that two years pass before shareholders or the 
state would know whether the PBC had fulfilled its specific 
public benefit, and this diminishes the increased accountability 
intent behind the Model Legislation.221 However, the Model 
Legislation’s reporting requirement is not without its 
weaknesses. The Model Legislation’s requirements for annual 
reports are vague and have resulted in benefit corporations 
releasing annual reports that are nebulous and seem more like 
marketing materials than complete, fair evaluations of the 
benefit corporation’s progress.222 The Model Legislation also 
lacks an effectual enforcement method for corporations that do 
not follow the reporting requirement.223 As such, the annual 
report requirement could be improved by requiring benefit 
corporations to disclose specific information tied to their 
performance via an effective enforcement method. However, 
between the two, the Model Legislation’s approach sets a 
higher benchmark for annual reporting, which would benefit 
EMOs in terms of increasing accountability and effective 
branding. 
The Model Legislation’s third-party standard requirement 
is also a better option with regard to improving EMO 
accountability to investors and states. Under Delaware’s 
statute, the lack of a third-party standard may lead to directors 
choosing easy requirements to measure their work against.224 
EMOs can increase the states’ trust by choosing a reasonable 
third-party standard for evaluating the corporation’s annual 
report, as the Model Legislation does not specify the type of 
third-party standard benefit corporations should choose. The 
mistake that some EMOs may make is choosing a lax third-
 
 221 Murray, supra note 207, at 360–61. 
 222 Id. But see ANNUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORT, PATAGONIA WORKS 
(2013), http://www.patagonia.com/pdf/en_US/bcorp_annual_report_2014.pdf (This is an 
outstanding forty-three page benefit corporation report that goes into detail on the 
corporation’s progress towards fulfilling their general and specific stated public 
benefits). 
 223 Murray, supra note 207, at 360. 
 224 Hasler, supra note 182, at 1321. 
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party standard. However, this would be detrimental to the 
branding purpose and would not be advisable.225 Thus the 
Model Legislation’s third-party standard requirement could be 
improved by setting out some minimum standards put in place 
by a select few well-established third-party organizations that 
a benefit corporation would need to consider when choosing a 
third-party standard to evaluate its annual report against.226  
Delaware’s requirement that PBCs state a specific public 
benefit is actually more stringent than the Model Legislation’s 
general public benefit requirement. In this regard, Delaware’s 
approach would be more advisable for an EMO.227 By requiring 
an EMO to focus on a specific public purpose, it is more likely 
to pursue that purpose. Directors would more easily recognize 
the EMO’s objective, thus improving accountability.228 Even 
though the specific public purpose provision is not required 
under the model approach, an EMO benefit corporation in a 
state that follows the Model Legislation can still specify a 
specific public benefit that it wants to pursue in conjunction 
with the mandatory general public benefit.229 
There are some lingering questions regarding benefit 
corporation legislation in general that EMOs will want to keep 
in mind when deciding whether to move forward with becoming 
benefit corporations. First, there is no case law regarding how 
a court will assess a benefit corporation’s balancing of various 
stakeholders if a plaintiff brings an enforcement action against 
the corporation.230 EMOs may find this uncertainty 
unappealing and they may wait until an enforcement 
proceeding has gone through a court to see what the court does. 
Second, the overall lack of enforcement mechanisms other than 
the vague shareholder enforcement action under the Model 
Legislation makes it difficult to ensure compliance or to discern 
further corporate exploitation.231 Third, the Model Approach 
 
 225 Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 
681, 725 (2013). 
 226 Kimbrell, supra note 168, at 581. 
 227 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2013). 
 228 J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, 
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27, 33 (2012). 
 229 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2016). 
 230 Ercoline, supra note 188, at 183. (However, “legal scholars commonly agree 
that the courts will apply the traditional business judgment rule in benefit enforcement 
proceedings when evaluating the Board of Director’s decision-making process.”). 
 231 Kennan Khatib, The Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 
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requires benefit corporations to consider their impact on society 
and the environment.232 It is unclear how courts will interpret 
this provision and whether the lack of an equivalent 
environmental purpose could create a legal issue for a benefit 
corporation, as would be the case with EMOs.233 It is hard to 
believe that benefit corporation legislation was intended only 
for use by businesses whose primary focus is benefitting the 
environment, thus EMOs could argue that their environmental 
benefit is having a positive material impact on surrounding 
communities by improving K–12 education.234 However, it 
remains to be seen how broadly courts will read the 
“environment” language.  
Finally, stakeholders other than shareholders do not have 
standing to bring enforcement proceedings.235 This is 
problematic because the people most likely to be negatively 
affected by a benefit corporation’s decisions are groups like 
employees and those living in surrounding areas who do not 
have standing to bring enforcement actions. In the case of 
EMOs, the groups most affected by an EMO’s failure to follow 
through on its public purpose would be the students and 
parents as well as charter school operators. However, given the 
difficulty that a court would have in discerning who constitutes 
a stakeholder whose interest the benefit corporation must 
balance, it is understandable that the legislation left 
enforcement proceedings to shareholders as a discernable 
group. Shareholders who invest in an EMO benefit corporation 
likely have the stakeholder’s interests at heart. If a 
shareholder who has standing to bring an enforcement 
proceeding observes the EMO failing to fulfill its public benefit, 
he or she can instigate an enforcement proceeding in the 
interest of the stakeholders. 
Overall, it would be in an EMO’s best interest to choose a 
state that follows the Model Legislation more closely than 
Delaware. It may seem counterintuitive to become a benefit 
corporation in a state other than Delaware, as most states look 
 
189 (2015). 
 232 Katherine R. Lofft, Is A Hybrid Just What the Doctor Ordered? Evaluating the 
Potential Use of Alternative Company Structures by Healthcare Enterprises, 25 A.B.A. 
HEALTH LAW. 9, 12 (2013). 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(c) (2016). 
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to Delaware on corporate law matters.236 However, their lax 
attitude towards benefit corporation legislation is actually 
detrimental to the social enterprise movement, as it renders 
the legislation essentially toothless; many of the requirements 
that make the Model Legislation powerful are optional under 
Delaware law.237 If a business, such as an EMO, is trying to 
send a message via their branding that they are serious about 
pursuing a social good as well as making profits, then it would 
be wise for EMOs to consider becoming benefit corporations in 
a state that follows the Model Legislation more closely than the 
hands-off Delaware approach. 
C. Why Should EMOs Ultimately Choose to be Benefit 
Corporations? 
EMOs should choose to become benefit corporations 
primarily for branding purposes in order to regain the trust of 
state legislatures and to prevent further bans on EMO-charter 
school partnerships.238 The Model Legislation’s benefit 
enforcement proceeding gives shareholders more power to 
bring an action for the corporation’s failure to consider the 
interests of various stakeholders.239 Restricting the remedy to 
an equitable (rather than monetary) one ensures that plaintiffs 
will begin such proceedings solely to align the director’s actions 
with the corporation’s stated public benefit, thus increasing 
accountability and state trust in EMOs.240 The presence of a 
third-party standard requirement for assessing the benefit 
corporation’s business decisions would also strengthen the 
trust between EMOs and states.  
EMOs may be concerned that becoming benefit corporations 
would scare away investors. These fears are likely unfounded. 
Investing in social enterprises, known as “impact investing,” is 
 
 236 Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and 
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 889 (1990) (“Because of Delaware’s market dominance, 
the General Corporation Law of Delaware controls the internal affairs of thousands of 
corporations, including more than half of the 500 largest industrial firms in the United 
States.”); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of 
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 195 (2011) (“In the 
competition for corporate charters, Delaware has since the beginning of the twentieth 
century stood alone as the decisive winner.”). 
 237 See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 238 Murray, supra note 228, at 44. 
 239 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301 (2016). 
 240 Thornsberry, supra note 153, at 180–81. 
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becoming a more frequent occurrence.241 In a J.P. Morgan study 
examining social enterprise investing, researchers found that 
impact investing offers potential over the next ten years for 
invested capital of between $400 billion and $1 trillion with 
profits of $183 billion to $667 billion.242 From 2010 to 2012, 
sustainable and responsible investing had a growth rate of over 
22%, and this growth has continued.243 Generating positive 
change motivates investors who invest capital in social 
enterprises.244 Those same investors reject the “binary” 
approach that their investments can either maximize their 
return or maximize a social impact.245 Social enterprise 
investing is poised to become a common sector of a diversified 
portfolio, allowing people to make “feel good” investments 
without worrying that they have to give up substantial profits 
to do so.246 Further, customers are expressing a greater interest 
in services from corporations that take into account their 
societal and environmental impacts. Consumer surveys show 
58% of American consumers are more likely to purchase 
products from a socially conscientious company.247 Thus given 
the recent trend in social impact investing, EMOs will likely 
not have too much trouble finding investors or charter schools 
as customers. 
EMOs branding themselves as benefit corporations would 
also have the positive effect of attracting charter schools with 
whom EMOs can contract, as they are more likely to trust 
EMOs whose stated purpose is to advance charter school goals 
when they are shopping around for a business to partner 
with.248 If an EMO can attract enough charter schools through 
benefit corporation branding, then the EMO will be able to 
scale its model and attract investors who are interested in 
 
 241 NICK O’DONOHOE, J.P. MORGAN, IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET 
CLASS 1, 7 (2010), 
https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/Impact%20Investments%20an%20Emerging%20A
sset%20Class2.pdf (“Impact investments are investments intended to create positive 
impact beyond financial return.”). 
 242 Id. at 6. 
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double- or triple-bottom line investments.249 
V. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to Gordon Gekko’s speech in Wall Street, greed is 
not the way forward for EMOs. Several financial events over 
the past decade have left Americans dissatisfied with the 
current state of corporations—most notably, the 2008 subprime 
mortgage crisis.250 Now, consumers and investors are becoming 
more cognizant of the businesses that they choose to support.251 
It is wishful thinking to believe that, left to their own devices, 
all EMOs can operate without misusing public funding. 
Repeated instances of financial mismanagement by EMOs have 
shown that some EMOs cannot act in a socially responsible 
manner. In a bid for survival, EMOs will need to choose 
between two alternatives. They can continue to operate under 
their current business model, and risk that a few dishonest 
EMOs will justify states banning all EMOs from partnering 
with nonprofit charter schools or risk that the states will 
institute onerous regulations that result in EMOs no longer 
being able to operate in those states.252 Such responses will 
result in a huge loss in EMO profits. 
The second alternative is benefit-corporation branding. By 
choosing to become benefit corporations, EMOs that truly want 
to pursue the dual purpose of improving charter school 
education and profiting at the same time can separate 
themselves from those EMOs that exist to increase their profits 
at the expense of charter schools. If they do, states may be less 
likely to react to the few disingenuous EMOs with a state-wide 
ban on EMOs. 
EMO greed can and has caused entire states to ban EMOs. 
 
 249 Id.; Thornsberry, supra note 153, at 185. 
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Wake of the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown without the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 457 (2010). 
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EMO greed has damaged their reputation as well as the 
reputations of the charter schools with whom they contracted. 
EMO greed has detracted from the charter school movement as 
a whole, which is a movement that has the potential to make 
many positive changes for children with otherwise limited 
possibilities. Benefit corporation status would enable EMOs to 
fulfill their mission. They can continue to help charter schools, 
make a personal profit, and regain the trust of states that are 
about to pull the trigger on legislation that outlaws EMO 
operations completely.  
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